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Abstract
Food labels legislated by the U.S. government have been designed to provide information to consumers. It has been asserted
that the simple disclosures “produced using genetic engineering” on newly legislated U.S. food labels will send a signal that
influences individual preferences rather than providing information. Vermont is the only US state to have experienced mandatory labeling of foods produced using genetic engineering (GE) via simple disclosures. Using a representative sample of
adults who experienced Vermont’s mandatory GE labeling policy, we examined whether GE labels were seen by consumers
and whether the labels provided information or influenced preferences. Nearly one-third of respondents reported seeing a
label. Higher income, younger consumers who search for information about GE were more likely to report seeing a label.
We also estimated whether labels served as information cues that helped reveal consumer preferences through purchases, or
whether labels served as a signal that influenced preferences and purchases. For 50.5% of consumers who saw a label, the
label served as an information cue that revealed their preferences. For 13% of those who saw the label, the label influenced
preferences and behavior. Overall, for 4% of the total sample, simple GE disclosures influenced preferences. For a slight
majority of consumers who used a GE label, simple disclosures were an information signal and not a preference signal.
Searching for GE information, classifying as female, older age and opposing GE in food production significantly increased
the probability that GE labels served as an information source. Providing such disclosures to consumers may be the least
complex and most transparent option for mandatory GE labeling.
Keywords Genetic engineering · Bio-engineering · Labeling · GMO · GE · Genetically modified organism · Consumer
behavior · Information
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Introduction
Labels play a significant role in facilitating consumer choice
in the case of credence goods; goods for which consumers
cannot determine through search nor experience whether a
product contains an attribute or quality they prefer (Caswell
1998; Caswell and Mojduszka 1996; Fulton and Giannakas
2016). Credence characteristics can impact the liking of food
(Fernqvist and Ekelund 2014).
Labels typically provide information to consumers about
a desired or undesired attribute, without changing their preference for that attribute (Nelson 1970, 1974). However, it
has been asserted that “produced using genetic engineering”
labels not only provide consumers with information, but may
also send a signal that influences individual preferences. If
labels signal more than information by influencing consumer
preferences either for or against Genetically engineered (GE)
foods, consumers lose autonomy and self-determination in
their decision making (Siipi and Uusitalo 2011).
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Vermont is the only US state to have experienced mandatory labeling of foods produced using GE. Simple disclosures, “produced using genetic engineering” or “partially produced using genetic engineering,” were required
on foods during July of 2016. Federal labeling legislation,
signed into law by President Obama on 27 July 2016, superseded all pending state legislation (A bill: S. 764 2016).
However, labels on packaged goods persisted for months
and are still seen on a variety of food packaging. In early
May of 2018 the United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) released a set of proposed disclosure labeling rules
for genetically modified foods. These proposed rules include
five main disclosure alternatives, only one of which is a
simple text disclosure on packaging (USDA n.d.). The new
language also changes the abbreviations GE, GM, or GMO
to BE for bio-engineered. Because this study examined labeling before USDA’s suggested wording change to BE, this
paper uses GE nomenclature.
Using a representative sample of adults who experienced Vermont’s GE labeling policy, this study is designed
to answer two research questions: who saw the mandatory
labels and, given a label was seen, was the label an informational signal or a signal that influenced preferences? This
research contributes to the food labeling in general, and GE
literature specifically. It is the first study to utilize data on
mandatory GE labels in the United States to identify consumer characteristics associated with seeing “contains GE”
in the actual marketplace. Additionally, importantly, the
study examines characteristics of respondents associated
with using label information to reveal preferences and characteristics associated with using labels to form preferences.
This information is useful to policy makers currently designing both the federally legislated mandatory label symbol and
associated label disclosure.

Literature review
The empirical literature presents mixed findings about
the informational versus signaling impact of GE labels on
consumer attitudes and/or preferences. Even less is known
about how labels will impact consumer purchase decisions.
Because the US marketplace has not experienced mandatory
GE labeling, all research has been hypothetical, with the
exception of Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018).
Hu et al. (2005) conducted experiments on the telephone
with respondents to assess consumer utility for labeled or
non-labeled GM bread products and found that a hypothetical mandatory labeling requirement resulted in higher
consumer utility. Two controlled experiments concerning
hypothetical consumption choices conducted by Costanigro
and Lusk (2014) concluded that the signaling effects of GE
labels on two types of foods were minimal and likely too
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small to be able to consistently detect. Similarly, Kolodinsky
(2008) found that rBST labeling on milk provided cognitive
information instead of sending signals associated with subjective feelings. Bansal et al. (2013) used an experimental
auction approach in India and found that the informational
cue of labeling was stronger than any negative signaling cue.
Research has also found labels to be a signal that influences attitudes and/or preferences. Huffman et al. (2003)
used an auction-based experiment to conclude that labeling
bias had a significant impact on participant decision making.
Kanter et al. (2009) present experimental evidence that labeling non-rBST milk produced a stigma effect that reduced
consumers’ willingness to purchase conventional milk. Lusk
and Rozan (2008) conducted a mail survey to elaborate an
econometric model which demonstrated that consumers who
believed that the US government had a mandatory labeling
policy were more likely to believe that GM food was unsafe.
Comparing the mandatory labeling requirements in the EU
with the voluntary requirements in Canada, Gruère et al.
(2008) conclude that mandatory labeling may actually have
removed consumer choice because high costs of segmenting
may have reinforced bias against foods with GE. Bukenya
and Wright (2007) found similar results. In the only study
of actual mandatory labeling situation in the US, Kolodinsky and Lusk (2018) compared Vermonters’ opinions
of GE foods with a national control group of respondents
from regions outside of Vermont and New England before
and after the enactment of the Vermont legislation. After
controlling for key demographic characteristics, their difference-in-difference model found that Vermonter opposition
towards GE technologies in food production decreased by
19%. That is, Vermonters were less opposed to GE after the
mandatory labeling law went into effect.
While the above studies highlight labels as an informational cue or preference shifting signal, there is scant
research on how information or signals translate into consumer behavior. Cook et al. (2002) found that a positive
10% change in attitude reduced the number of people with a
strong intention not to purchase GE foods by 10.08%. Vecchione et al. (2014) found significant correlations between
attitudes and behavior, and knowledge and behavior. Willingness to pay (WTP) studies using either survey or experimental approaches consistently find that consumers require
a discount to purchase foods produced using GE. The general finding across studies is a lower WTP for GE goods
when compared to non-GE goods ranging from 1 to 21%
and $0.023 to $0.90 per unit of respective product (Bruno
and Campbell 2016; Bukenya and Wright 2007; Colson et al.
2011; Huffman et al. 2003; Wachenheim and VanWechel
2004). While a premium for non-GM goods is common,
between 32 and 53% of consumers are never willing to pay
any premium (Bruno and Campbell 2016; Loureiro and Bugbee 2005; Loureiro and Hine 2002). However, whether a
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Fig. 1  Model of impact of GE
labels on consumer decision
making
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label acts as an information cue that reveals preferences for
non-GE alternatives or serves as a signal that forms preferences is not known from experimental WTP studies that
introduce hypothetical labeling scenarios. Did the labels
change preferences and lead to a lower WTP? Or, did the
labels serve as an informational cue that revealed less preference and thus lower WTP for GE foods?
To date, there is no consistent answer in the literature
as to whether mandatory GE labels provide information or
send a signal that changes preferences. In short, we know
little about how labeling policy actually impacts consumer
choices. This study seeks to fill this void using data from
Vermont, the only US example of mandatory “produced or
partially produced using genetic engineering” disclosures.

Conceptual model
The study of consumer behavior has long recognized the
importance of both cognition and affect on choice (see, for
example, Peter and Olson 2009). Cognition refers to thinking, including knowledge and beliefs about a product. Affect
refers to feelings, including liking and disliking a product.
There are several other significant theoretical perspectives
commonly employed to examine the impact of mandatory
GE labels on consumer behavior. First, we consider consumer autonomy theory, which draws from philosophical
ethics and emphasizes the role of free choice in consumer
decision making (Beauchamp 2005; Beauchamp and Childress 2001; Markie 2007; Siipi and Uusitalo 2008). Autonomous choice is one in which a consumer refers to their
self-determination to make choices in the marketplace.

Reveal Preferences
(Behavioral Change)

No
impact on
choice

Buy GE
product

Do not
buy GE
product

Autonomy assumes authenticity; that is, authentic desires
come without coercion or influence (Siipi and Uusitalo
2011). This is not incongruent with revealed preference
theory in microeconomics in which preferences are given in
a choice situation and are revealed through purchase (Samuelson 1938).
Both the ideas of autonomy and revealed preferences
allow empirical modeling with choice as the outcome, and
both assume that preferences are given and drive choice
behavior. Neither theory stipulates that choices made are
inherently “good” or “bad,” only that consumer preferences
are the basis of choice. A third theory is stigma theory,
rooted in transdisciplinary risk theory and found in the fields
of sociology, marketing, communication, and consumer
behavior (see, for example: Ellen and Bone 2008; Gregory
et al. 2001; Link and Phelan 2001; Scholderer and Frewer
2003). Stigma implies a negative reaction by consumers.
For example, if a label implies a product is risky, consumers may not make a purchase. Given the possibility of both
stigma and reassurance of labels, we must not assume that
consumers will only have negative reactions to a product
characteristic, but also consider the possibility that labels
might have the opposite effect, as found by Kolodinsky and
Lusk (2018).
We conceptualize the above discussion into the model in
Fig. 1. Environmental variables, including consumer demographics, attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, experience with
labels, and search behavior impact whether or not people
observe a GE label. Given a label is observed, there are
three paths. The first is that the label influences consumer
attitudes, either stigmatizing or reassuring them about GE
technologies used in food production. In this scenario, labels
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form consumer preferences and influence behavior. The second path is that labels inform consumers that the product
was produced using GE. It does not form their preferences,
but helps to reveal preferences, prompting the consumer to
either choose or avoid the product. The third path is that
the label is observed but is of no consequence in a purchase
decision.

Data
Our study uses data from a survey of Vermont residents
conducted in the fall of 2016 and the spring of 2017. The
study was approved by the institutional review board of the
University. All interviewers were trained and administered
computer-aided telephone interviews (CATI). Response data
were secured electronically on a password-protected server
at the University of Vermont. The sample of called respondents was drawn using area code exchanges for landlines and
cellphones in Vermont. Respondents who were not currently
living in Vermont or under the age of 18 were screened out.
Follow-up calls were placed at various days and times of
the week if there was a busy signal or no answer. Any given
phone number was called a maximum of three times. Consistent with current trends in phone subscriptions, a majority
of the respondents (64.0%) were reached on a cell phone.
A total of 1034 responses were collected; 942 respondents had complete information required for the multivariate analysis. The results based on a group size of 942 have
a margin of error of ± 3.19% with a confidence interval
of 95%. The sample is similar to Vermont with regard to
income distribution, gender, race, and ethnicity. As is typical
with phone surveys, the sample is older and more educated
than the general population. Telephone surveys still reach a
large portion of the population (Marken 2018). A majority
of respondents were either opposed or very opposed to the
use of GM in food production, about one-fifth were neutral, and a little over one-fifth were supportive. More than
half of all respondents identified GM as a “transfer of genes
that would not occur in nature,” a modified version of the
definition used by the World Health Organization (2014).1
Almost a quarter of respondents reported that they search for
information about GE (active search), while almost one-half
reported paying attention to information if it “catches their
eye” (passive search). A majority of respondents consult
front of package labels, use ingredient lists, utilize nutrition information, and notice organic and natural labels on

1

WHO defines genetically modified foods as: “organisms (i.e. plants,
animals or microorganisms) in which the genetic material (DNA) has
been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or
natural recombination.”

13

J. Kolodinsky et al.
Table 1  Summary statistics for selected demographic and response
Variable
Data collection period (n = 942)
Fall 2016
Spring 2017
Gender (n = 942)
Female
Male
Age (continuous) (n = 942)
Standard deviation
Education (n = 942)
Less than a bachelor’s degree
Bachelor’s degree or more
Income (n = 942)
Income less than $50,000
Income greater than $50,000
Hispanic/Latino (n = 923)
Not Hispanic/Latino
Hispanic/Latino
Race (n = 903)
White
American Indian or Eskimo
Black or African American
Asian or Pacific Islander
Some other race
In a family with children (n = 942)
In a family with children
Not in a family with children
Support of GMOs in food supply (n = 916)
Strongly support
Somewhat support
Have no opinion
Somewhat oppose
Strongly oppose
Identify GM (n = 942)
Identify GM as “Transfer of genes that would not
occur in nature”
Identify GM as “Transfer of genes that would/might
occur in nature”
Search attributes (n = 942)
Active search
Passive search
Consults product info on front of package
Consults ingredient list
Consults nutrition information
Notices organic food label
Notices “natural” food label

Proportion
41.4%
58.6%
52.7%
47.3%
54.9
16.6
49.2%
50.8%
44.7%
55.3%
98.2%
1.8%
96.9%
1.3%
1.0%
0.8%
0.0%
28.7%
71.3%
6.1%
15.7%
21.4%
24.0%
32.8%
55.5%
44.5%

22.9%
47.2%
52.3%
79.7%
80.8%
59.3%
51.0%

foods. Table 1 provides a summary of key demographic and
response characteristics for the respondents.
Figure 2 identifies the paths taken by the sample of
respondents with regard to seeing a label, whether the label
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Fig. 2  Breakdown of respondents who saw and used and did not use GE labels in purchasing decisions

was an information cue that revealed preferences or a signal
that changed attitudes which led to behavior.

Statistical model
This analysis used Heckman’s (1979) sample selection
model to examine whether an individual saw a label and,
if so, whether and how purchasing behaviors changed as
a result. To do this, a categorical “preference/choice category” variable was constructed to specify three groups
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Table 2  Sample selection model estimates of seeing a GE label and use of label information
Variable

Income $50,000 or greater
“GMO” is transfer of genes that would not occur in nature
Spring data collection
Female
Bachelor’s/professional degree
Family with children
Age
Oppose or strongly oppose GE
Support or strongly support GE
Active search dummy
Passive search dummy
Consults product information on front of packaging (low
fat, reduced calorie, etc.)
Consults ingredient list
Consults nutrition information
Looks for labeling indicating food is organic
Looks for labeling indicating food is “natural”
Estimated probability at data means

Binomial probit
estimate: saw label

0.070** (0.031)
0.033 (0.031)
− 0.025 (0.030)
− 0.029 (0.030)
0.049 (0.031)
− 0.012 (0.034)
− 0.004*** (0.000)
− 0.019 (0.042)
0.027 (0.047)
0.245*** (0.050)
0.131*** (0.039)
− 0.094*** (0.032)
0.026 (0.045)
0.004 (0.044)
0.023 (0.037)
0.073** (0.034)

Marginal effects of estimates
Did not use label

Information cue
and used label

Preference signal
and used label

0.008 (0.145)
− 0.078 (1.904)
− 0.090 (0.168)
− 0.168** (0.071)
0.005 (2.758)
− 0.059 (0.277)
− 0.003 (0.003)
− 0.332*** (0.065)
0.365*** (0.096)
− 0.470*** (0.072)
− 0.437*** (0.064)

− 0.025 (0.211)
0.100 (0.663)
0.060 (0.138)
0.179** (0.066)
− 0.059 (0.241)
0.086 (0.190)
0.005* (0.002)
0.441*** (0.052)
− 0.269* (0.159)
0.456*** (0.086)
0.351*** (0.096)

0.016 (0.168)
− 0.021 (0.267)
0.029 (0.286)
− 0.010 (0.409)
0.053 (0.110)
− 0.026 (0.170)
− 0.001 (0.002)
− 0.108** (0.050)
− 0.095 (0.105)
0.013 (1.396)
0.085 (0.158)

.36

.49

.15

N = 942 respondents. Standard errors in parentheses. Multinomial logit with selection computed marginal effects at the mean
***, **, *Indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level

of respondents who observed labels. These groups are
described in the tree diagram in Fig. 2.
We first estimated the probability of seeing the label using
a binomial probit model. The first stage model included
the variables income (dummy = 1 for income greater than
$50,000), define GMO (dummy = 1 if respondent indicated a transfer of genes that would not occur in nature),
time period (dummy = 1 for Spring 2017 vs. Fall 2016),
gender (dummy = 1 for female), education (dummy = 1 for
Bachelor’s or professional degree), family with children
(dummy = 1 if household has children under the age of 18
present), age (continuous), opposition to GMOs used in food
production (dummy = 1 if opposed or strongly opposed),
support for GMOs used in food production (dummy = 1 if
support or strongly support), active seeking of information
on GMOs (dummy = 1 if seek out information), passively
seeking information on GMOs (dummy = 1 if pays attention if it “catches my eye”), use of other types of food labels
(dummy = 1 if uses “natural” labels; dummy = 1 if uses
organic labels), uses front of package information (low fat,
reduced calorie, etc.) (dummy = 1 if yes), consults ingredient
list (dummy = 1 if yes), and consults nutrition information
(dummy = 1 if yes).
We next estimated the preference/choice category of the
respondent with a sample selection/multinomial logit model
that provided marginal effects at the means (MEMs) which
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accounted for the first stage of whether or not a label had
been observed.

Results
Column 1 of Table 2 presents results of the first state binomial probit that estimated whether or not the respondent saw
the label. The variables age, actively seeking information
on GMOs, passively seeking information on GMOs, and
consultation of information on the front of packaging were
significant and negatively associated with seeing a GE label.
Being above median income, active and passive search, and
using natural labels increased the probability of seeing the
label.
Columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2 present results of the second stage multinomial logit model that predicted preference/
choice categories, given a label was seen. The predicted
group percentages at the mean values of the independent
variables were 36% for not being influenced by the label,
49% for using the label to reveal preexisting preferences,
and 15% for being influenced by the label without a preexisting preference. The model estimates parallel the descriptive
data: 36% of respondents reported not being influenced by
the labels they saw, 49% used the label information to reveal
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their preference, and 15% reported being influenced by the
label.
In the multinomial logit model, gender was significant for
the first two preference categories. That is, being a female
was related to a respondent being less likely to not be influenced by the label and more likely to use the label as information that helped reveal their preferences through a purchase. Opposition to GE was significant for all three types
of preference categories at the 1% level. Respondents who
reported being opposed to the use of GMOs in the production of food were more likely to use the label information
to reveal their preferences through purchase and less likely
to either not use the label or to use the label as a signal
that influenced preferences and purchase decisions. Support
for GE increased the probability of not using the label and
decreased the probability of the label information being used
to reveal preference through purchase. Both active and passive seeking of information significantly decreased the probability of not using the label and increased the probability of
using the label as information that helped reveal preferences
through purchase.

Discussion and conclusion
The answer to our first research question, “did consumers
see the mandatory GE label?” is yes, in part. More than
one-third of respondents reported seeing GE label. This
figure is similar to that found by Christoph et al. (2018)
for the percentage of participants that used nutrition facts
labels frequently (31.4%). Of these, about two-thirds of label
readers used ingredient lists (Christoph et al. 2018). Others
have reported that about half look for ingredients on labels
(Ollberding et al. 2011). In the present study, purchase decisions were not affected for about one-third of respondents
who saw GE labels. An FDA study found that 57% of people
who don’t use labels “buy what their family likes” (Lin et al.
2016). Our results are not out of line with other food label
use. However, while there is a large body of literature about
characteristics of people who use labels and whether label
use leads to behavior change, there is scant literature on the
prevalence of label use with regard to specific ingredient
characteristics not on the ingredients list, but available elsewhere on a food package Thus, there are few comparisons
that can be made with our results concerning GE label use
and previous research.
Our second research question was, did labels convey information or change preferences? For about half of
respondents who saw labels, the label provided information on which they based their purchases of GE-containing or GE-free foods. For about 15% of respondents, the
label served as a signal that formed preferences and influenced their purchases of GE-containing or GE-free foods.
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Estimates using a multivariate model predicted responses
that fell into these three categories within 2% points of the
raw data values.
For about one in eight consumers who saw the label and
4% of the total sample, the mandatory GE disclosure acted
as a signal to inform preferences and influence behavior.
Further, 47.8% of these people used the label to avoid foods
produced using GE and almost 1.7% used the label to purchase such foods. As noted by Costanigro and Lusk (2014),
there is little evidence of a negative signaling effect of labels.
In our study, it was less than 2% of the sample. Lack of significant predictor variables for those respondents who did
not have preexisting preferences suggests that consumers
whose preferences may be influenced by labels may not be
easily identified.
For one in two consumers who saw the label, and 15.5%
of the total sample, labels acted as an information cue. These
consumers used the label to reveal their preferences. The
majority of these, 96.5%, desired to avoid foods produced
using GE, and 3.5% used the information to purchase foods
produced using GE. Gender (female), age (older), being
opposed to GE used in food production and actively or passively searching for information were characteristics that
increased the probability of using labels as an information
cue. This indicates that about 15% of consumers will avoid
GE foods if they are labeled with a simple disclosure.
For more than one in three consumers who saw the label
and 11% overall, the label was not related to a purchase decision. Gender (male), being supportive of GE used in food
production, and not actively or passively searching for information were characteristics that increased the probability of
not using label information.
As the US government moves forward with the implementation of the National Bioengineered Food Disclosure
Standard, our results show that, for a slight majority of
respondents who indicated they used the labels with simple
disclosures, labels were an informational source that helped
with decision making. For a small percentage of respondents, labels were a signal that influenced preferences and
purchase behaviors. Simple disclosures on labels are only
one of five proposed ways to provide consumers with information. Websites listing more information, phone numbers
on packaging to call or text message for product information, “scan here for more information”-type QR codes, and
“Bioengineered” icons are also proposed. This study cannot
provide any insight into these other disclosure methods. That
said, because simple disclosures provided the information
consumers needed to make their purchase decisions, this
method makes sense. Full information is on the package,
there is no complexity or extra time or equipment needed
to access the information, and the information does not act
as a warning against GE for 96% of consumers included in
this study.
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Groups supportive and opposed to GM both use arguments based on sustainability, environmentalism, and social
and economic development, but the exact long-term benefits
and risks posed by the use of GM remain unclear (Kolodinsky 2018; Perry et al. 2016; Zhang et al. 2016). Additionally,
while at the present time foods produced using GE have
not been found to harm health, there is an emergence of
literature highlighting shortcomings in research about the
benefits of GE on society (Catacora-Vargas et al. 2018). US
consumers will be increasingly able to make choices about
consumption of GE foods with the implementation of mandatory labeling of products produced using GE, expected in
2020 (USDA 2018). Consumers need information in order to
make utility maximizing decisions in the marketplace. Based
on evidence from the only policy initiative in the US that
required mandatory GE labels, we conclude that simple disclosures work. For those that use labels, simple disclosures
provide information that aids in decisions that maximize
consumer utility.
Based on our results, it is unlikely that mandatory GE
labels with a simple disclosure will cause a collapse of GE
agricultural production methods, as feared by label opponents. Instead, they should help markets work more effectively. By providing information, consumers who desire to
either purchase or avoid GE foods can make decisions that
meet their needs. This result is similar to that found with
voluntary rBST free labels; the labels provide information
for consumers (Kolodinsky 2008). Consumers who do not
read GE labels will continue to rely on product characteristics that meet their needs.
There are limitations of this study. The data used in this
study are cross sectional, thus this analysis is limited in the
extent to which any kinds of causal links can be determined.
This study was completed in only one US state. As is typical
with phone surveys, the sample is older and more educated
than the general population. However, it is important to note
that telephone surveys still reach a large portion of the population (Marken 2018). Despite these limitations, this is the
only study that we know of examining the signaling effect
of a mandatory GE labeling policy in the U.S., as Vermont
has been the only state to implement such a policy.
Funding This project was funded by the Vermont Agricultural Experiment Station through the National Institutes for Food and Agriculture.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativeco
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the
Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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